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Since the United Nations General Assemblys adoption of the Declaration on Human
Rights Defenders in 1998, there has been considerable effort to recognise and protect
the right of individuals, groups and communities to promote and protect their own
rights and the rights of others. Over time, a multi-level, multi-actor international
protection regime for the rights of human rights defenders has emerged, derived from
the international human rights regime. Actors in this goal-driven regime adopt a
human security approach, emphasising the importance of having a holistic, multi-
dimensional understanding of security. In this article, we note positive
developments in state commitment to the protection of defenders, as well as the
debates, tensions and contestation that continue to exist. We emphasise the need for
critical appraisal of the construction, function and evolution of this protection regime
as well as its multi-scalar social and political effects, both intended and unintended.
We highlight three speciﬁc areas where critical scholarship is needed to understand
the nature of this protection regime, discussing the contributions of authors in this
special issue: the deﬁnition and use of the term human rights defender; the
effectiveness of protection mechanisms; and the complex relationship between
repression, activism and risk. In conclusion, we identify key areas for further research
related to human rights defenders, stressing the need for the development of theory
and practice related to their risk, security and protection.
Keywords: human rights defenders; risk; security; protection; regime
The human rights defender protection regime
The United Nations (UN) General Assemblys adoption of the 1998 Declaration on the
Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly
known as the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders)1 marked a milestone in the devel-
opment of a multi-level, multi-actor international protection regime for the rights of human
rights defenders. This regime has had a long genesis; the declaration itself was a product of
a slow and drawn-out drafting process lasting over 15 years, marked by tension, disagree-
ment and compromise.2 Since its adoption however, there has been considerable effort to
recognise and protect the right of individuals, groups and communities to promote and
protect their own rights and the rights of others.
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
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What are the key features of the human rights defender protection regime? First, it
derives its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge3 from the international human rights regime. The declaration
itself did not create new rights, but reafﬁrms rights that are instrumental to the defence
of human rights.4 Over time, a number of key principles have emerged in the operation
of this regime. These include: the recognition of local actors as key agents of change;
the importance of promoting and protecting civil society space5; the need to tailor protec-
tion interventions to meet the unique and speciﬁc needs of individuals, groups and commu-
nities6; and the necessity of complementing reactive measures with efforts to build a safe
and enabling environment for the defence of human rights.7
Second, the regime is goal driven  its aim is to protect and support defenders who
operate in their own contexts in the face of threats and risks. Depending on the circum-
stances and the actors involved, these threats and risks might include surveillance, harass-
ment, verbal and written threats, stigmatisation, criminalisation, restrictions on funding and
registration as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), arbitrary arrest and detention,
spurious investigations, fabricated charges, unfair trials, kidnapping, torture, ill-treatment
and killings.8 Perpetrators range from state actors to non-state actors  such as government
ofﬁcials, armed forces, police ofﬁcers, religious fundamentalists, transnational corporations
and criminal gangs. In a signiﬁcant number of cases, defenders do not know the identity of
those who attack them.9
Third, the regime adopts a human security paradigm, with individuals, groups and
communities as subjects of security rather than states. Its goal-driven, practice-oriented,
rights-based nature helps actors in this regime sidestep some of the debates that question
the usefulness of the human security paradigm for meaningful action, policy and research.10
Similar to proponents of a broad human security approach (in particular, those who adopt
a feminist framework11), defenders and practitioners have emphasised the importance of
having a holistic, multi-dimensional understanding of security. Women human rights
defenders, in particular, emphasise the importance of understanding how discrimination,
stereotyping and stigmatisation  rooted in social structures in society, such as patriarchy
and the militarisation of society  compromise security.12
Jane Barry and Vaida Nainar reﬂect on how women human rights defenders deﬁne
security as including: freedom from constant threats, economic security, political security,
environmental security and health security, which resonate with deﬁnitions of human secur-
ity that encompass the dimensions of freedom from want and freedom from fear.
Drawing upon reﬂections of women human rights defenders around the world, they intro-
duce the term integrated security:
For us, security has to be integrated, which means employment, social wellbeing, development
and national sovereignty in terms of natural resources. Security is not only for the individual,
but also for the community.13
This concept  especially its emphasis on self-care and personal wellbeing  has resonated
deeply with defenders around the world.14 Organisations that conduct security training
(such as Front Line Defenders, Protection International and Tactical Technology Collective)
draw attention to the importance of interventions in three interconnected domains  phys-
ical security, digital security and self-care. Some defenders and practitioners argue that self-
care is both a necessary act of physical and psychological protection as well as a political
strategy for sustaining and furthering the work of defenders.15
884 K. Bennett et al.
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Fourth, it is a multi-level regime  formal protection mechanisms for human rights
defenders exist at the national, regional and international levels. In Mexico, for example,
defenders are able to seek protection measures from the government through the 2012
Law for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists16; make urgent
appeal to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders to
request the government to take all appropriate action on behalf of a human rights defender
at risk; gain practical support from European Union (EU) embassies on the basis of the EU
Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders; and make petitions to the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (IACHR) in the hope that it will request Mexico to adopt precau-
tionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to the defender. However, there is
geographical unevenness in the availability of protection mechanisms. Many countries
have neither enacted laws nor created institutions that recognise and protect the rights of
human rights defenders.
Fifth, the regime has many stakeholders  civil society groups, donors, national human
rights institutions, states, multilateral bodies and individual defenders  who create and use
different types of tools, strategies and tactics to identify, support and protect the rights of
human rights defenders. These include the provision of emergency grants, temporary relo-
cation initiatives, security training, advocacy, accompaniment, trial monitoring, networking
and capacity building.17
In the next section of this article we show how there has been growing commitment by
some governments to protect human rights defenders around the world. We then contrast
these developments with examples of how other governments continue to challenge the
legitimacy of defenders and restrict their rights. We turn to three speciﬁc areas where critical
scholarship is needed, highlighting the contributions of authors in this special issue: the
deﬁnition and use of the term human rights defender; the effectiveness of protection
mechanisms; and the complex relationship between repression, activism and risk. Empha-
sising the need for critical appraisal of the construction, function and evolution of this pro-
tection regime as well as its multi-scalar social and political effects, intended and
unintended, we identify key areas for further research.
Developments in the normative framework
Over the past three years, there have been a number of initiatives that strengthen the nor-
mative framework for the protection of human rights defenders. At the national level, Swit-
zerlands Federal Department of Foreign Affairs published guidelines on the protection of
human rights defenders in 2013, aimed at making the work of Swiss diplomats and ofﬁcials
in this area of work more coherent, systematic and effective.18 That same year, the United
Kingdom issued its ﬁrst National Action Plan to implement the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, which included strengthening support to defenders engaged in
business and human rights problems.19 In 2014, Côte dIvoire adopted the Law on the Pro-
motion and Protection of Human Rights Defenders  the ﬁrst African state to enact speciﬁc
legislation to protect human rights defenders.20
At the regional level in Europe, both the Council of the EU and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have strengthened their contribution to this
protection regime through recent policy developments. In 2014, the EU marked the 10th
anniversary of its European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders by committing
better support for vulnerable and marginalised human rights defenders, women human
rights defenders and those operating in remote regions; advocating for the creation of a
safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders; and strengthening the
The International Journal of Human Rights 885
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implementation of an effective and coherent policy on human rights defenders.21 The
OSCE (within its Ofﬁce of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) initiated extensive
consultations with human rights defenders and other human rights experts across the OSCE
geographic regions to develop the OSCE Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders, published in June 2014, to harness better protection and support for human
rights defenders by member states.22
Internationally, in 2013, the Group of Eight (G8) adopted a Declaration on Preventing
Sexual Violence in Conﬂict that acknowledged the vital role of women human rights
defenders, committing to provide them with better protection.23 In 2013, the UN
General Assembly passed the ﬁrst ever resolution on the protection of women human
rights defenders.24 The UN Human Rights Council has also passed a number of important
resolutions that signify its commitment to the protection of human rights defenders. This
included Resolution 22/6 on Protecting Human Rights Defenders in March 2013, which
outlined the gravity of the deteriorating climate for human rights practice around the
world. This resolution emphasised that more must be done to address attacks and reprisals
against defenders, unjust laws that criminalise defenders, and impunity for actions against
defenders.25
States have also recognised that some human rights defenders are particularly vulner-
able  such as those who work on contested issues (such as sexual and reproductive
rights, and rights abuses related to extractive industries, land and the environment) as
well as those who hold particular identities and come from speciﬁc communities (such
as women human rights defenders, LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and inter-
sex) defenders and indigenous people).26 States have also raised concerns about the security
of defenders in a number of ways, including through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
process.
In 2014, the outgoing UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defen-
ders, Margaret Sekaggya, used her last report to the Human Rights Council to set out a fra-
mework for building a safe and enabling environment for defenders.27 The new Special
Rapporteur Michel Forst, in his ﬁrst report, reemphasised the importance of disseminating
the declaration and raising the visibility of the situation of human rights defenders. He com-
mitted to addressing national legislative impediments to the work of defenders; challenging
impunity for human rights violations against defenders; and tackling reprisals against
defenders, in particular those who engage with the UN and other international and regional
human rights mechanisms.28
Debates, tensions, contestation
While there have been positive developments in the evolution of this regime, some states
continue to challenge the recognition, legitimacy and integrity of the work of defenders.
Defenders continue to be attacked, even in countries where they have legally enforceable
rights to promote and protect human rights. National laws and administrative practices
that criminalise defenders have been justiﬁed by some states in terms of their measures
to protect national sovereignty; counter terrorism and extremism; further economic security
and development; and assert particular cultural, traditional and religious norms and prac-
tices. In September 2014, for example, the Egyptian government revised Article 78 of its
Penal Code introducing severe penalties for those accessing or facilitating access to
foreign funding. In India, every NGO receiving funds from foreign sources requires
either prior permission or registration under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act
(FCRA) 2010. This legislation has been used to target those dissenting from the economic
886 K. Bennett et al.
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model pursued by successive governments that violates the human rights of Adivasi tribal
peoples and other communities.29
In countries where laws are enacted to criminalise human rights defenders practice,
more research is needed to document the immediate impact on defenders, and to consider
how such laws may have wider regional inﬂuence and multi-sectoral impact. For example,
following Russias clamp down on civil society practice through oppressive legislation (i.e.
limits on foreign funding for NGOs), we now see similar laws being debated by legislators
in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.30 Such measures are used not only in repressive
regimes but also in nominally or fully democratic states.31 In the United Kingdom, for
example, the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Admin-
istration Act 2014 restricts civil society organisations (CSOs) in the period before an elec-
tion by setting ﬁnancial limits on regulated campaigning activities above which there is a
legal duty to register. Indeed, the International Centre for Not-for-Proﬁt Law has documen-
ted the introduction or enactment of measures to constrain civil society in more than 50
countries between January 2012 and December 2014.32 Protection-oriented actors who
support defenders around the world struggle to respond effectively to this diverse and
rapidly changing legal and administrative environment that impacts defenders. While
there have been a number of notable initiatives to address these restrictions,33more research
and analysis is needed to understand, prevent and respond to them effectively.
Another troubling development is the extent to which states conduct surveillance and
share intelligence on defenders. In some cases, spurious intelligence reports and statements
by public ofﬁcials purportedly based on intelligence data misrepresent defenders and NGOs
as impediments to economic growth and threats to national economic security.34 States also
continue to use anti-terrorism legislation and measures to criminalise defenders and restrict
the activities of NGOs. For example, Uzbekistan has consistently used anti-terrorism laws
as part of an aggressive campaign against defenders, criminalising  and in some cases tor-
turing  them for purported religious extremism, terrorism and wahhabism.35A number of
states have also drawn upon Recommendation 8 of the Financial Action Task Forces Inter-
national Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and
Proliferation to regulate and restrict NGOs under the guise of preventing terrorist ﬁnancing
and money laundering.36
Increasingly, human rights defenders ﬁnd their recognition by and access to the UN
under attack. The legitimacy and integrity of their work has been called into question
during Human Rights Council sessions and in General Assembly resolutions related to
human rights defenders and to civil society space.37 This has been the case not only by
states such as China and Eritrea that see any form of civic protest or challenge to state auth-
ority as anathema to social and political stability, but by democratic states with growing
geopolitical inﬂuence, such as South Africa and India.38 In addition to direct confrontation
with the human rights defender framework within the UN, states hostile to the work of
defenders impede defenders access to the UN by delaying applications for United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) status and engaging in reprisals
against those who attempt to engage with human rights mechanisms.39 There have also
been cases where human rights defenders experience harassment, intimidation and
threats during and following their engagement with the Human Rights Council. Such
was the experience of journalist Gnanasiri Kottegoda from Sri Lanka in 2012, who was sub-
jected to a state-sanctioned smear campaign. A pro-government TV channel broadcast
images of him and called him a traitor. He was forced into hiding when military intelligence
sought him out, and eventually ﬂed the country. Some states have held back from working
with the Special Procedures mechanisms, and some states have also demonstrated a lack of
The International Journal of Human Rights 887
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engagement with requests made through the UPR process to protect the rights of human
rights defenders.
The deﬁnition and use of the term human rights defender
Although the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders itself does not use the term human
rights defender, in practice, the deﬁnition is derived from Article 1, which states that:
Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for
the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and
international levels.
This term has been used to refer to a broad range of individuals and collectives promoting or
protecting human rights, including lawyers, journalists, activists, trade unionists, members
of community-based organisations, people in social movements and staff of human rights
organisations involved in different work in very different contexts. It has been used to refer
to those less obviously characterised as rights defenders, including protesters, teachers, stu-
dents, social workers, health care professionals, community workers, sexual minorities,
religious minorities and peace builders, amongst others.40 The term human rights defen-
der tends to be invoked when those engaged in rights-related work are threatened or put
at risk for what they do  it is a way of legitimising, bringing visibility to and reiterating
their right to do this type of work.
There are clear reasons and beneﬁts for using this term, not least that it confers on
defenders recognition and status within the international human rights framework
through which they can access support, protection and redress for violations. Furthermore,
many funds, programmes and resources are speciﬁcally allocated for work related to
human rights defenders, and NGOs and individuals who want to access these funds
use this term in their proposals and activities. However, being called a human rights
defender is not always advantageous  in some cases, the use of the term can inadver-
tently raise the level of risk that defenders face and be used to politicise their work.
Some aggressors have also started to appropriate this term, referring to themselves as
human rights defenders, to the consternation of civil society groups who see them as per-
petrators of rights abuses.41
Protection-oriented actors are concerned about ensuring that the deﬁnition corresponds
to the breadth of actors put at risk for defending human rights. Matters are complicated by
the fact that, in many cases, human rights defenders do not refer to themselves as human
rights defenders. Furthermore, the declaration and associated protection mechanisms do
not set out clear decision-making processes to help with status determination.
The Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has tried to
provide guidance on who should be referred to as a human rights defender through a fact-
sheet called Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights (hen-
ceforth Fact Sheet 29).42 Fact Sheet 29 suggests three minimum standards required for a
human rights defender: that the person accepts the universality of human rights; that the
persons arguments fall within the scope of human rights (regardless of whether or not
the argument is technically correct); and that the person engages in peaceful action.
However, some essential questions remain, including: To what extent does a defender
need to demonstrate that his/her actions are non-violent? To what extent should a defender
be expected to demonstrate knowledge of and respect for the universality of human rights?
What criteria and process should be adopted to determine this?43
888 K. Bennett et al.
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Enrique Eguren and Champa Patel44 (this issue) suggest that the current basis for this
deﬁnition does not provide enough guidance for those determining if a speciﬁc individual,
organisation, group or community is a human rights defender. They are concerned that such
ambiguity potentially hinders the protection of defenders. Eguren and Patel argue for the
development of a critical and ethical framework that focuses on analysing what a defender
does or does not do in context, making it a relational deﬁnition rather than one of identity
per se. This, they assert, provides a clearer framework for decision-making, which increases
the effectiveness of protection mechanisms and forestalls misappropriation of the term by
states or other aggressors. In their article, they analyse the three standards presented in
Fact Sheet 29 to show how critical theory can enable an ethical understanding of who
behaves as a human rights defender.
The effectiveness of protection mechanisms
A frequent criticism of protection mechanisms  including by the Women Human Rights
Defenders International Coalition  is that they often do not take a holistic, gender-sensitive
approach to protection.45 Defenders and practitioners have also expressed concern about
the uneven and inconsistent protection and support provided to defenders, resulting in
some defenders from particular groups and those in speciﬁc geographic regions being par-
tially or completely excluded. There is scant research evaluating how different protection
mechanisms perform for defenders.
Karen Bennett46 (this issue) examines the effectiveness of the implementation of the EU
Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders since the revision of this policy directive in 2008.
Drawing upon participatory research conducted in Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia and Thailand, she
identiﬁes reasons for gaps in implementation and shortcomings in the integration of the
guidelines in the EUs human rights country strategies. Bennett points to good practice
in implementation, but also barriers to and constraints upon the capacity and willingness
of diplomats to implement the guidance and defenders from accessing the envisaged
support. Bennett argues that the EUs policy on defenders needs coherence with other
EU human rights foreign policy commitments and that wider foreign and economic
policy directives should adopt a rights-based approach that is inclusive of the guidelines.
Bennett provides both a practice and policy review of how the implementation of the
guidelines on human rights defenders, as an evolving regional mechanism contempora-
neous with other EU human rights policy initiatives, can be utilised more consistently in
supporting and protecting defenders.
At times human rights defenders at risk have also gained protection from an older,
more established international regime  that created for refugees. Martin Jones47 (this
issue) observes there has been little attention paid to the intersection between these two
protection regimes. Arguing that direct engagement can be productive, he suggests that
the provision of asylum to individuals who ﬂee because they champion human rights
causes could provide new ideological currency to the refugee regime, which has seen
the gradual erosion of popular support since the end of the Cold War. He also notes
that defenders face an additional problem to the difﬁculties commonly experienced by
other refugees  how to remain effective in their human rights work while living in
another country. Tracing the development of temporary international relocation initiat-
ives for human rights defenders at risk, Jones suggests that these provide a productive
example of the intersection of the two regimes. His contribution underscores the impor-
tance of examining the interaction between this evolving protection regime and other
more established (protection) regimes.
The International Journal of Human Rights 889
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Repression, activism and tactics for managing risk
A complex relationship exists between the repression of defenders and their defence of
human rights; in some cases, repression triggers new forms of mobilisation and activism.
The tactics and strategies that defenders use to manage their own security and to respond
to risk are diverse, creative and highly adapted to local contexts. As some have observed,
there is sometimes a gap between what defenders do and how transnational actors under-
stand and support them, which can lead to ineffective protection and support measures.48
Two articles in this collection examine the ways in which human rights defenders have
developed and adapted tactics to respond to repression in non-democracies. Elisa Nesossi49
(this issue) examines human rights practice by Chinas weiquan (rights-defence) lawyers
over a 12-year period (20032014), analysing how these lawyers use the courts and the
media to protect vulnerable groups, challenge power and highlight problems with access
to justice. Noting that the Communist Party has publicly denounced weiquan lawyers
and that they work in spite of political adversity and direct personal risk, she observes
that repression  paradoxically  creates new opportunities for action. In particular,
Nesossi observes how weiquan lawyers maximise opportunities for change that emerge
as a result of repressive action and divisions amongst the political elite; and that they do
so with the support of inﬂuential allies, by drawing upon the diversiﬁcation of the
media, and through developing social networks.
In a similar vein, Laura Lyytikainen and Freek Van der Vet50 (this issue) provide useful
insight into how two different groups of Russian human rights defenders  youth activists
participating in public protest campaigns in Moscow and lawyers bringing the cases of
victims of the conﬂict in Chechnya to the European Court of Human Rights  respond, per-
ceive and manage the high levels of risk involved in their work. Drawing on research con-
ducted from 2005 to 2013, at a time when the Russian State Duma passed a number of laws
that signiﬁcantly restricted the activity of defenders, these authors show how human rights
defenders who operate in highly repressive contexts experiment with new tactics to conduct
advocacy, manage fear and challenge the boundaries of state power. These tactics include
developing ﬂexible work methods, routinising protest, building legal literacy and mental
resilience and using vulnerability to demonstrate state violence and repression.
Key reﬂections and ways forward
Amongst some defenders and practitioners, we see growing consensus aboutwhat constitutes
security and protection, and how this is to be achieved, bywhom and for whom.However,
while systematisation and standardisation in protection activities can provide some clarity
about who should act, how and towhat end, there is also a risk that orthodoxways of thinking
will result in rigidity and exclusivity in policies and practices. As such, they may fail to keep
pace with emerging threats to defenders, the changing nature of civic action, and actors and
actions that promote and protect human rights. The ﬁve papers in this special issue provide
timely and important contributions that raise vital questions about the evolving protection
regime for human rights defenders. Yet, critical gaps in knowledge and understanding
remain.51 In particular, these articles point to the need for further research on:
. The construction, function and evolution of the human rights defender protection
regime (including changes in its strength, organisational form, scope and allo-
cation mode52). This includes examining: the means and conditions under which
state and non-state actors cooperate with each other to strengthen  or undermine
 the protection of defenders; how power, interests and knowledge shape the
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protection regime; the governance of protection mechanisms and how those that
operate at different levels relate to each other; how this protection regime relates to
other international (protection) regimes; and how different factors such as technologi-
cal evolution, regional security concerns, and political alliances inﬂuence this protec-
tion regime at different levels;
. Issues arising from the institutionalisation of the deﬁnition of human rights defen-
der. This includes examining: the beneﬁts and drawbacks of the use of this term;
to whom it is applied and to whom it is not; the power-relations, politicisation,
inequality and ethical issues that arise from the use of this term;
. Perceptions of and attitudes to risk amongst human rights defenders. This includes:
the subjective conceptualisation of security and protection; the relationship
between the social construction of risk and identities; the strategic use of risk for
advocacy; the security behaviours of defenders in the way they manage their risk;
how defenders build resilience and strategies for safety in different types of risky
environments; how culture, gender and diversity give rise to protection needs for
those who challenge societal and institutional discrimination, especially women
and LGBTI rights defenders;
. How the quality, quantity and type of networks  amongst human rights defenders
and between them and their supporters  have protection effects. This includes: the
relationship between trust, solidarity and security; the way stigmatisation is resisted
through counter-narratives and community support; how alliances are built, and how
they are weakened; and how local relationships have been reconstituted in the light of
the development of the protection regime for human rights defenders.
We strongly encourage the facilitation of collaborative research and the circulation of ideas
between academics, practitioners and defenders. This might be through: academic research,
seminars and conferences; research embedded in civil society programmes and projects;
and more strategic and sustained foci in the form of new research hubs that develop
theory and practice related to risk, security and protection. Such initiatives help us
to interrogate how the protection regime for human rights defenders has evolved and
strengthens our imagination of what it should be.
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